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INSURER'S REFUSAL TO SETTLE-A PROPOSAL FOR
IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY ABOVE POLICY LIMITS
LIABILITY insurance policies reserve to the insurance company absolute
control of the defense to any claims against the insured. The company may
settle or litigate as it pleases.' If the case goes to trial and results in a judg-
ment which exceeds the policy's limits, the insured will be personally liable
for the excess. Whenever an insurer refuses an injured person's offer to
settle for an amount below the policy limit, the insurance company, in effect,
will be gambling with the insured's money.2 Therefore the policy-holder
Section 8(d) further provides that "the duties so imposed shall not be construed as
requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions
contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective
before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract."
In Allied Mills, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949), the Board adopted the trial examiner's
statement that this portion of 8(d) "refers to terms and conditions which have been
integrated and embodied into a writing .... with respect to unwritten terms dealing
with 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,' the obligation remains
on both parties to bargain continuously." This interpretation was reaffirmed by the
Board in Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949), and was followed
by the Steel Industry Board appointed by the President in July 1949. STEEL INDUsTRY
BoARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE LABOR DispuTE IN
THE BASIC STEEL INDUS TRY 76-8 (1949). The recent case of Jacobs Mfg. Co., 28
LAB. REL. REP. (Labor-Management) 1162 (1951), however, may indicate a slight shift
in the Board's position. In the Jacobs case, a 3 to 1 majority of the Board held that
a party must bargain during the life of a contract on issues which were not discussed
during pre-contract negotiations and are not mentioned in the contract itself. But the
Board split 2-2 on the question whether a party must bargain during the contract period
on subjects which are not mentioned in the contract but which were discussed during
pre-contract negotiations. Regardless of how the Board ultimately decides this issue,
however, it should not affect the problem of amending an existing contract to cover
new conditions brought about by a shift in parties. By hypothesis, the terms of the
existing agreement are not applicable; therefore the addition of new terms should not
be regarded as a "modification."
1. The standard policy provides that "the company shall (a) defend in his name and
behalf any suit against the insured alleging such injury or destruction and seeking damages
in amount thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company
shall have the right to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim
or suit as may be deemed expedient by the company." For a full discussion see SAWYER,
AuTOmOBILE LIABIL INsuRAxcE (1936).
The insurance company's exclusive control over the settlement applies only to claims
for an amount less than the policy limit. To the extent that claims exceed the policy cov-
erage, however, the insured may compromise his own possible liability. Gen'l Accident Fire
and Assur. Corp. v. Louisville Home Telephone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S. W. 1031 (1917) ;
see City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 648-50, 225 N. W. 643, 644
(1929).
2. Insurance companies are in a position to say to the insured, "Heads I win, tails you
lose." Cf. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S. C. 286, 293, 170 S. E.
346, 348 (1933) ; Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Mississippi Cent. R. Co., 116 Miss. 114, 135, 76
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hopes his insurer will accept any settlement offer below the limit; he has
nothing to gain and may well lose by litigation. The company, on the other
hand, becomes more inclined to litigate the claim as the settlement offer tends
to approximate the amount of the policy.
3
These conflicting interests are brought into sharp relief when an insured
suffers a judgment for an amount above the policy limits and then tries to
recover the excess in a suit against his insurer who has declined a settle-
ment offer within the policy limits. 4 In early cases, courts construed the
company's contractual obligations narrowly.6 And they justified the corn-
So. 646, 653 (1917) (dissenting opinion) (the company held the insured in the "hollow of
its hands").
3. Olympia Fields Country Club v. Banker's Indemnity Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60
N. E. 2d 896 (1945). In this case the insurer, on a $10,000 policy, refused an offer to settle
for $3500 before trial. The claimant then recovered a judgment for $20,000. Before appeal
the victim offered to settle for $8,000 and was again refused. The judgment was affirmed.
Thus ultimately the insurer was gambling the insured's $10,000 against a possible loss
(beyond the final settlement offer) of its own $2,000. See also Tyger River Pine Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S. C. 286, 170 S. E. 346 (1933).
4. One theory of recovery is based upon agency principles. The rule is fundamental
that a person may not act as the agent of another where his interests are adverse to those
of his principal, without the full knowledge and consent of the principal. MECHEM, Our-
LINES OF AGENCY § 167 (2d ed. 1903). However, holding the insurer the agent of the
insured does not violate this rule since the insured knows of the adverse interest and con-
sents to the continuation of the relationship. But despite the principal's knowledge and
consent, the conduct of the agent is subjected to close scrutiny to determine whether he
has acted in bad faith or negligently toward the principal. Traders and General Ins. Co. v.
Rudco Oil and Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Christian v. Preferred Accident
Insurance Co., 89 F. Supp. 888 (N. D. Cal. 1950); Stowers Furniture Co. v. American
Indemnity Co., 15 S. W. 2d 544 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929) ; MEcHE, OUTLINES OF AGENCY
§ 178 (2d ed. 1903). But cf. Foremost Dairies v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196
S. E. 279 (1938) (in negotiating settlements the insurer acts as an independent contractor
rather than as an agent).
The second theory is couched in contractual terms. Hf~ere the insurer's refusal to settle
is often held to be a breach of the obligation to assume the insured's liability to the extent
of the policy coverage. The underwriter is regarded as having "contracted to take charge
of the defense of the claim," so that the contract "created a relation out of which grew the
duty to use due care when action was taken." Douglas v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 376, 127 Atl. 708, 711 (1924).
5. This inflexible doctrine arose almost exclusively from employer liability insurance
cases. The injured employee would offer to settle; the insurer would refuse; and an
excess judgment would follow. The insured would assert that the refusal to settle, ipso
facto, placed the burden of any subsequent judgment upon the insurer. But the courts
generally held that such unlimited liability could not be read into a limited liability con-
tract. See St. Joseph Transfer and Storage Co. v. Employer's Indemnity Corp., 224
Mo. App. 221, 231, 23 S.W.2d 215, 220 (1930) (insurer is under no duty except that for
which he has expressly contracted); accord, Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity and
Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 Atl. 503 (1889); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Cotton Mills
Products Co., 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931); Best Building Corp. v. Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928); Wisconsin Zinc. Co. v.
Fidelity and Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 52, 155 N.W. 1081, 1087 (1916).
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pany's exclusive control of the defense on the likelihood that the insured
would otherwise always accept any compromise offer below the policy limit."
Gradually, however, courts began to recognize that in some cases the insurer
should be liable. Abuse of the policy-holder's helplessness led to the setting
up of certain judicial standards for measuring the company's conduct during
negotiations for settlement.
The first standard of conduct evolved was that of good faith. In order to
win reimbursement, the policy holder must sustain the burden of proving that
the company intentionally disregarded his financial interests in dealing with
a liability claimant7 jurisdictions following the good faith rule require some
evidence on which a jury could base a finding that the insurance company
rejected a settlement offer (within the policy limits) which the company
itself considered reasonable.8 Thus, advising an insured to place his property
beyond reach of an anticipated excess judgment,9 setting up a reserve to
cover possible liability to the policy-holder,10 refusing to accept a settlement
For a realistic discussion which recognizes the inferior bargaining position of most
policy-holders, see the dissenting opinion in Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Mississippi Cent.
R. Co., 116 Miss. 114, 76 So. 646 (1917). Here the insured was a railroad corporation.
Because of its ability to bargain on an equal footing with the insurer, it secured a policy
providing that if the insurer refused a settlement offer below the maximum coverage of
the policy, the policy limit would be doubled.
6. See Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 377, 127 At.
708, 711 (1924); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 288,
170 S.E. 346, 348 (1933) ; Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 4, 235
N.W. 413, 415 (1931). But cf. Traders and General Ins. Co. v Rudco Oil and Gas Co.,
129 F.2d 621, 627 (10th Cir. 1942). See also Note, 8 MiNN. L.Rnv. 151 (1924).
7. Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 491, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
Yet no "intentional disregard" was found in many cases where an outrageous disparity
between the settlement offer and the judgment existed. E.g., McDonald v. Royal In-
demnity Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 308, 162 Atl. 620 (1932) (insurance company refused offer
of $2,000; verdict of $20,000) ; Best Building Co. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.,
247 N. Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928) (offer of $8,500 refused; verdict $16,000). Johnson
v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., supra (offer of $5,500 refused; verdict $14,000);
Burnham v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 10 Wash.2d 624, 117 P2d 644 (1941) (offer
of $3,500 refused; verdict $21,400).
8. This rule requires a showing of conduct approaching fraud. An honest error of
judgment is not bad faith; nor is the failure to prejudge, within a degree of certainty,
the outcome of a lawsuit. It is not sufficient that hindsight reveals that a settlement
would have been wiser, nor even that foresight suggests it to some extent. "The gift
of prophecy has never been bestowed on ordinary mortals... ." Georgia Casualty Co.
v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 454, 46 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1932). Cf. Noshey v. American Auto-
mobile Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934) ; Wilson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
76 A.2d 111 (Me. 1950); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225
N.W. 643 (1929).
9. Noshey v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934).
10. Lanferman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 222 Wis. 406, 267 N. W. 300 (1936).
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offer recommended by its adjustor or counsel,'- and rejecting a settlement
offer because the insured would not assume a part of its own contractual
liability, 12 have all supported findings of bad faith. However, an intentional
disregard of the insured's interests is ordinarily so hard to prove that policy-
holders seldom recover under this rule.13
An alternative standard upon which some courts base a finding of liability
is negligence 4-rejecting an offer of settlement which an ordinarily prudent
businessman would have taken.', Negligence has been found in the refusal
11. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Ameri-
can Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 736
(1933) ; Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
12. Boling v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935).
13. To escape liability the insurance company can always show some justification
for its decision to litigate rather than settle. Of course, the insurer's conduct is seldom
patently fraudulent, since any company which consistently ignored the interests of its
policy-holders would lose business quickly. But in at least one case an insurance company
has escaped liability even after apparently coercing a policy holder into contributing to a
settlement. Neuberger v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 18 Ala. App. 72, 89 So. 90 (1921).
See Note, 7 MiN. L.REv. 337, 340 (1923) spelling out the contractual theory which
absolved such insurers from liability.
In a few cases the injured party has tried to collect the excess from the insurer, but
generally without success. Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Assn., 101 F.2d
987 (8th Cir. 1939); Bartlett v. Travelers Insurance Co., 117 Conn. 147, 167 AtI. 180
(1933) ; Duncan v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 91 N. H. 349, 23 A.2d 325 (1941).
Blit cf. Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
14. Most jurisdictions hold that negligence is a question for the jury. E.g., Tyger
River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S. C. 286, 170 S. E. 346 (1933). See
8 APPLEMAN, INsuRANcE LAW AND PRAcrCu §§ 4712-13 (1942).
In determining whether or not the insurance company was negligent in its duty to
the insured, the jury may consider the manner of conducting investigations, statements
obtained by agents, correspondence between the insurer and its attorneys, settlement
negotiations, conduct of the trial and pre-trial preparations, and general reports and
recommendations. Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 Pac. 583 (1920);
Mendota Electric Co. v. N. Y. Indemnity Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211 N. W. 317 (1926);
Dumas v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 94 N. H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947);
Pacific Coast Cement Co. v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 173 Wash. 534, 23 P.2d 890
(1933).
However, for a recent illustration of the difficulty of proving negligence, see Wilson v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 76 A.2d 111 (Me. 1950).
15. In Dumas v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 94 N. H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947),
the insurer had an opportunity to settle the claim for $4,000, this being $1,000 less than
the policy limit. The subsequent recovery was $12,000. The court felt that in consideration
of the permanence of the victim's injuries, the size of her out of pocket expenses, and the
overwhelming evidence of the driver's negligence, the prudent businessman would have
taken the settlement offer.
See also Traders and General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil and Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th
Cir. 1942), where civil actions totalling $63,000 were filed against Rudco which it settled
on its own initiative for $17,000 ($7,000 above the policy limit), but the insurer refused
to accept the settlement offer. The insurer was found negligent and ordered to reimburse
Rudco, even though if it had accepted the offer its maximum loss would have been $10,000.
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to act on advice of counsel,' 6 acting on the advice of misinformed counsel,'17
ineptitude or delay of local managers or claims agents,s and failure to con-
sider the extent of plaintiff's injuries.19 The negligence test thus differs from
that of bad faith in requiring only an accidental, as opposed to an intentional,
wrongdoing. Of course, bad faith will suffice for liability under either rule ;20
mere negligence, however, is not bad faith.
21
But in the vast majority of cases today, the only evidence against the insur-
ance company is a simple refusal to settle. And this by itself amounts to
neither negligence nor bad faith.22 The question remains, though, whether
the existing standards of care do not sanction a practice involving deplorably
low ethics. For by reserving exclusive control over settlement, the insurer has
the policy-holder's interest altogether at its mercy. Reasonably, then, the
insurer should be held to the standard of conduct required of a fiduciary. In
this view, the company's insistence upon litigating a claim which could be
settled within policy limits should be regarded as an act of bad faith.23 The
insured has paid for protection up to a stated amount. When a settlement
offer gives the company a chance to afford protection within this amount, why
should it be allowed to shift much of the hazard of turning down that chance
16. Lanferman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 222 Wis. 406, 267 N. W. 300 (1936).
17. Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 94 N. H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947);
Douglas v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 Atl. 708 (1924); High-
way Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
18. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S. C. 286, 170 S. E. 346
(1933).
19. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Com.
App. 1929).
20. However, it is far easier, both on the law and the facts, to establish negligence on
the part of an insurer than it is to establish bad faith or fraud. See Burnham v.
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 10 Wash.2d 624, 117 P.2d 644 (1941).
21. Bad faith and negligence could be defined so as to minimize or even do away with
any distinction between them. This is neatly illustrated by two Wisconsin cases. In one of
them, good faith is defined as "that degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary
care and prudence would exercise in the management of his own business were he in-
vestigating and adjusting such claims." Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204
Wis. 1, 10, 231 N.W. 257, 261 (1930). Negligence, on the other hand, is defined as
the doing of an act, or omitting to take a precaution, which under the circumstances
present, the doer, as an ordinarily prudent person, ought reasonably to foresee "will
thereby expose the interests of another to an unreasonable risk of harm." Osborne v.
Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242, 234 N.W. 372, 379 (1931). The concept of due care
appears to be the controlling element in both definitions.
22. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Violana, 123 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir.) cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 672 (1942) ; Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777
(1932) ; Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931) ; W11ynnewood
Lumber Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E. 946 (1917).
23. The duty to defend should include a duty to settle if that be the best defense. See
Sanders v. Frankfort Marine Insurance Co., 72 N.H. 485, 497, 57 At. 655, 658 (1904);
Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Com. App.
1929).
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onto the shoulders of the insured? A rule placing this risk on the company
would be much fairer. Such a rule would not compel the company to accept
all offers of compromise within the policy limits; rather it would only mean
that the entire risk of a subsequent judgment exceeding those limits would be
on the company.
To reach this new rule, the company's exclusive control of the defense
could be construed to include, by implication, an agreement to accept all
sub-coverage offers, Failure to settle would afford a conclusive presumption
of negligence or bad faith, whichever test the particular jurisdiction uses to
impose excess liability. The jury's role in reimbursemen t suits would then be
confined to deciding whether or not there had actually been a non-collusive
offer to settle.
24
The proposed solution would benefit all parties concerned-the injured
victim, the policy-holder, the courts, and the company. Insurer liability for
the excess should make it easier for the injured claimant to obtain a settlement.
The policy-holder would not be burdened with excessive judgments, and liti-
gation for reimbursement would decrease between policy holders and their
insurers. Insurance companies would not be measurably damaged since they
could, in time, easily shift the increased costs.25 Nor would the proposal
necessarily encourage the purchase of lower policies. For when th size of the
tortfeasor's policy is disproportionately small compared to the claim, settle-
ment offers will probably exceed the face value of the policy. Although
rejection of settlement offers within policy limits is a minor facet of the total
problem of spreading losses due to accidents, 26 shifting excess verdicts to the
insurance company would be a step in the right direction.
24. Much criticism has been aimed at the jury's role in this second lawsuit. The usual
charge is that in determining negligence or bad faith, intricate questions of law are
involved not within the understanding of the jurors. "No jury whatsoever is com-
petent to consider such an issue when even attorneys, expert in the fields of personal in-
jury and insurance law, might well differ upon the questions of due care by or good faith
of the insurer in such a situation." Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise
Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100, 111 (1938). But cf. Douglas v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 374, 127 At. 708, 710 (1924).
25. There is a lack of data concerning insurance company allocation of losses to speci-
fic causes. However, rates in an area are determined on the basis of gross losses paid.
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J.
549, 552 (1948). See also Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38
YArx L.J. 584, 720 (1929) ; Note, 8 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 729 (1941).
26. As a consequence of the development of the automobile and its widespread use, the
problem of adequate compensation for accident victims regardless of fault or financial
irresponsibility has caused much concern. A trend is recognizable to permit recovery not
only from the actual tortfeasor but also from interested persons who are more likely to be
financially responsible. Some of the manifestations of this trend are the "family purpose"
doctrine, "consent statutes," and statutes making states and municipalities liable for the
torts of their servants even though engaged in a governmental function. Birch v. Aber-
crombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913) ; Heyting, Automobiles and Vicarious Lia-
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